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On March 24, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began Operation 
Allied Force, the 78-day bombing campaign targeting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY). During the eleven weeks of bombing across Serbia and Kosovo, 400 Tomahawk cruise 
missiles were launched, 20,000 “smart” missiles were deployed, and 5,000 conventional bombs 
were dropped. After less than three months of NATO’s strategic aerial attacks, FRY president 
Slobodan Milošević agreed to withdraw troops. NATO ended the conflict in Kosovo, and for the 
first time in the history of warfare, military victory was achieved solely through the use of air 
power.1 
With the end of the 20th century came the end of its mode of warfare. Kosovo marked a 
turning point in how war could be fought without physical troops, how a campaign could be 
waged by an institutional body of states against another sovereign state, and how this body could 
utilize the language and goals of humanitarianism to sanction its use of force. NATO’s military 
intervention broke with international law and norms of sovereignty, most notably by refusing to 
wait for approval of its campaign by the UN Security Council (UNSC). However, NATO’s 
humanitarian-military alliance succeeded––global media and scholars of international law 
largely formed a consensus around the idea that the intervention could be justified ex post facto 
due to the brutal nature of Milošević’s ethnic cleansing campaign. According to the institutional 
rationale, NATO was obligated to break international law in order to protect the people of 
Kosovo from their despotic ruling state. Formal norms, like Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
(UN) Charter which guarantees sovereign rights to states, were neglected in favor of a new 
discourse, one defined by its universal applicability. 
 
1 Nick Cook, “War of Extremes,” Jane’s Defense Weekly (1999). 
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The post-Cold War world was to symbolize the victory of liberalism, democracy, 
capitalism, and the maintenance of a peaceful world order ensured by the promotion of universal 
humanitarian values. Conflicts, where they occurred, should have been aberrations to the new 
liberal-democratic consensus and could be dealt with by an international body of institutions 
acting on behalf of the abused and the global order. The intra-state conflicts of the 1990s 
therefore threatened the rule of liberal-democratic hegemony and its discourse of human rights 
protection. The shift after the fall of the Soviet Union was important in that it solidified the link 
between the global order and the concern for human rights. The mass mediatization of global 
conflicts also created new pressures and demands for governments to intervene in cases of 
human rights abuses.2 International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 
codified this new discourse which was officially titled at the 2005 UN World Summit as the 
“Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). The R2P was explicitly created in response to the Rwandan 
genocide and the Yugoslav conflicts of the 1990s. Since its establishment, the R2P has been 
invoked in over 80 UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, proving the significance of the 
humanitarian discourse in international relations.3 
The international community was successful in orienting Kosovo after the 1999 War of 
Independence towards a liberal-democratic, European societal model. This was made possible by 
the large-scale financial commitment of the international community to the issue of Kosovo: the 
international community sent 50 times more peacekeeping troops and 25 times more funds per 
capita than was used for Afghanistan after the 2001 war. In 2011––over a decade after the war––
 
2 See: Phil Hammond, Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Media and International Intervention (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2007); Jon W. Western, Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and 
the American Public (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
3 “What Is R2P?,” Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, accessed April 1, 2021, 
https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/. 
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Kosovo was receiving between four and ten times more aid per capita than any of its post-
conflict Balkan neighbors, and 19 times more aid than the average developing country.4 Today, 
Kosovo has a parliamentary government, an open economy, guaranteed personal liberties, and 
uses the euro as its currency. The aim of this paper is to examine the costs of the overall 
“success” of the international community. How was success achieved? What options were given 
to the local population in Kosovo at each stage in recent history? Who decided these options? 
These are the questions that I attempt to draw out of my analysis of Kosovo from 1999 to its 
present situation. 
On March 23, the day before the strikes began, the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. 
Javier Solana, gave a press release to publicize the decision of the organization:  
Let me be clear: NATO is not waging war against Yugoslavia. We have no 
quarrel with the people of Yugoslavia who for too long have been isolated in 
Europe because of the policies of their government. Our objective is to prevent 
more human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian 
population of Kosovo. We must also act to prevent instability spreading in the 
region.5 
 
NATO’s commitment to humanitarian values and international peace was clear. Solana goes so 
far as to say that the bombing campaign will not be “waging war,” but preventing human 
suffering. In this way, Kosovo marked the beginning of a new type of warfare and a new role for 
NATO following the Cold War. It was no longer necessary for a direct attack on member states 
to occur in order for NATO to begin an assault, nor did NATO need the military threat of the 
USSR. Further, NATO was to remain untouched by the bloody violence which both Milošević 
and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) engaged in by conducting essentially remote,  
 
4 Andrea Capussela, State-Building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and the EU in the Balkans (London: I.B. 
Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2015), 12. 
5 Javier Solana, “Press Statement- by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO,” Press Release, (March 23, 
1999), my emphasis. 
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“humanitarian” warfare.  
On the heels of NATO came an array of international actors, namely the UN, who took 
on roles of expertise in state-building and governance of a foreign territory. These experts and 
decision-makers shaped Kosovar society following the end of NATO’s intervention in the War 
of Independence, and it is this relationship which I will examine the consequences of 
intervention beyond the immediate aftermath; the decision on March 23 culminated in the 
creation of Kosovo as a protectorate-state, one which still lacks official state recognition from 
NATO, the European Union (EU) and the UN. Notwithstanding their positions on Kosovo’s 
status, the institutions, led by the UN, governed Kosovo through a civil administration for eight 
years following the end of the war. Organizations like the UN, EU, NATO, and the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) still hold physical presences in the form of 
offices and staff in Kosovo today. My goal in this paper is to delineate the contradictory logics of 
the international community in their role as crisis managers in Kosovo, making the country a 
laboratory for the emerging global paradigm of international peacekeeping, or rather “peace-
building” as the UN and EU would later articulate.  
I will argue that Kosovo serves as a unique, contemporary case of what I refer to as 
“disaster colonialism,” borrowing from Naomi Klein’s conception of “disaster capitalism.”6 In 
Klein’s examples, “disaster” refers to a vulnerable condition in which a populace is unable to 
express its popular will in the face of undemocratic economic neoliberal reforms, usually due to 
its focus on survival and recovery following a natural disaster. The condition of vulnerability is 
not limited to natural disasters; vulnerability can be caused by the shock of large-scale conflict. 
Disaster colonialism in Kosovo, I argue, was a project, one which needed a “disaster,” (based on 
 
6 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine (New York, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007). 
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the historical event of the 1999 War of Independence) in order for a series of international 
organizations to establish missions that would proliferate following the end of the war. The 
conflict between Kosovo and Serbia over the ownership of territory was seized by the 
international community as a “disaster,” catalyzing a self-justifying mechanism that foreclosed 
the expression of popular democratic will in post-conflict Kosovo. Without the watchword of 
“disaster,” I claim, the interventions in Kosovo, by NATO, the UN, and the European Union 
(EU) would not have been possible. Understood in this way, disaster colonialism is a 
programmatic, top-down method of post-crisis state-building that undemocratically implements 
techniques of governance imported by a colonizing power, bypassing the will or the consent of 
the populace. By manufacturing a “disaster”—which declares a populace no longer capable of 
deciding the future of their government or the shape of their own society––the international 
community was able to format a legal, economic, and political system in Kosovo that served the 
interests of a Western, liberal-democratic power structure.  
Disaster colonialism, then, attempts to diagnose the ways in which a foreign governing 
body is established, exercised, and multiplied in post-crisis situations by using universally 
accepted norms of international human rights to justify the wide-scale modeling of a society to 
serve not so much the interests of the governed, but rather the interests of the global order. In the 
case of Kosovo, the 1999 NATO intervention began the project of disaster colonialism by 
claiming a stake in the future of Kosovo. The UN continued the project for eight years with 
direct governance over Kosovo. After Kosovo declared independence in 2008, the UN 
transferred the remainder of its authority to the EU which utilized indirect methods of control––
financial imperatives, Kosovo’s lack of alternative sources of growth and aid––to finalize the 
mission of disaster colonialism. 
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The problematic of disaster colonialism in Kosovo differs from Klein’s disaster 
capitalism in that the colonized territory does not need to benefit the colonizer economically. 
Kosovo was a country of under two million people at the time of intervention and one of the 
poorest countries of Yugoslavia with few natural resources besides lignite, the lowest rank of 
coal and one of the most harmful to human health.7 The problem was not that the international 
community needed to intervene in order to subsume the coal mines in eastern Kosovo, for 
example, but that it needed the opportunity presented by the conflict in order to prove its 
relevance as an arbiter of peace and expert on governance.   
The use of the term “disaster colonialism,” however, requires certain qualifications. I am 
not attempting to offer a comprehensive discussion of the multitude of similarities between 
Kosovo and the colonialism of the past; this would be outside of the scope of my paper.8 In my 
usage of the term “colonialism,” I mean the subjugation of a population to the rule of a foreign 
body.9 Within the context of my analysis, colonialism refers to a governing relation in which the 
possibility of popular sovereignty is foreclosed by a regime of experts that undemocratically 
hijacks the governance of a population deemed to be beyond the people’s control. This regime of 
 
7 Consultant on Health and Energy- Turkey, HEAL, “Lignite Coal- Health Effects and Recommendations from the 
Health Sector” (Health and Environment Alliance (HEAL), December 2018), https://www.env-health.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/HEAL-Lignite-Briefing-en_web.pdf. 
8 Though I do not discuss the explicit historical links between older forms of colonialism and the colonial aspects of 
the international involvement in Kosovo, similar analyses can be found in the works of Ralph Wilde, Antony 
Anghie, and Roland Paris. All three authors have drawn parallels between modern UN missions and the practices of 
colonialism. See: Ralph Wilde, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing 
Mission Never Went Away, Oxford Monographs in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199274321.001.0001; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Roland Paris, At War’s End: 
Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
9 My conception of disaster colonialism will utilize Immanuel Wallerstein’s notion of the “colonial situation.” For 
Wallerstein, colonialism functions as a situation with a specific regime of power: “By the term colonial situation we 
simply mean that someone imposes in a given area a new institution, the colonial administration, governed by 
outsiders who establish new rules which they enforce with a reasonable degree of success. It means that all those 
who act in the colony must take some account of these rules…” Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of 
Independence and Unity, Bison Books Edition (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2005). 
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colonialism, contrary to historical European colonialism with its peak in the 19th century, is 
explicit in its primary purpose to improve the lives of the population over which it governs.10 
Disaster colonialism does not require the naked economic interest in the colonized territory 
which older forms of colonialism did.11 Thus, the direct exploitation of labor and natural 
resources central to historical colonial missions can be absent from the disaster colonialism 
which I describe.  
I do not aim to show the contradictions between what the colonizing force says and what 
it does. My argument rests on the contention that the international community in Kosovo did 
exactly as it aimed to do. The internationals in Kosovo were not bad-faith actors; the intentions 
of the mission to bring democracy and human rights to Kosovo were exactly the principles which 
the internationals followed. My main purpose, then, is not to critique the international 
organizations as hypocritical or ineffective, nor am I aiming to comment on whether the missions 
were “good” for the people of Kosovo. I am primarily attempting to draw out an implicit logic 
from the humanitarian intervention of the international community. The concept of disaster 
colonialism is used to show the type of governance and the logic of the international 
intervention, administration, and control over Kosovo. This is to say that I do not use the term 
“colonialism” as a metaphor for the administration of Kosovo or the attitudes of the international 
community. “Disaster” refers to the logic of the intervention and the missions which utilized 
crisis as a mandate for its operations; “colonialism” refers to the system of government put into 
place by the international community. 
 
10 The idea that the colonizing countries and empires brought technological and scientific advances, infrastructure, 
and social services to the colonized countries in order to help with the progress of the latter’s societies has been 
refuted by scholars across disciplines. See: J. M. Blaut, 1492: The Debate on Colonialism, Eurocentrism, and 
History (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 1892); Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Independence and Unity; 
Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar-Es-Salaam: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, 1973). 





To understand the circumstances which led to Kosovo’s case of disaster colonialism, it is 
necessary to describe the relevant history of the country which arose out of the breakup of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The multinational state of Yugoslavia was 
established twice in the 20th century: once in 1918 as a constitutional and parliamentary 
monarchy and again in 1945 as a single-party, multinational socialist federation.12 The nations 
consisted of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro. In 
addition to these republics, two autonomous regions were established within Serbia: Kosovo and 
Vojvodina. The purpose of the independent republics was to establish nations for the ethnic 
majorities in Yugoslavia which did not have their own state outside of Yugoslavia: Slovenia for 
the Slovenes, Croatia for the Croats, Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Bosniaks, etc. Thus, Kosovo 
and Vojvodina were left as non-republic, autonomous regions in order to protect their minority 
ethnic status but prevent a waterfall effect of self-determination and sovereignty claims.13 The 
structure was enforced via the central party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, even after 
the death of Josep Broz Tito, the president and “father” of Yugoslavia who was largely credited 
with keeping the multi-republic country united.14  
 
12 Calic, Marie-Janine, A History of Yugoslavia (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue Univeresity Press, 2019). 
13 Marc Weller, Peace Lost: The Failure of Conflict Prevention in Kosovo (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). 
14 Marie Janine-Calic, A History of Yugoslavia, 251. 
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Source: Central Intelligence Agency via Perry-Castañeda Map Collection 
 
Less than a year after the death of Tito on May 4, 1980, riots began throughout 
Yugoslavia in response to the worsening economic conditions. These riots were perhaps most 
pronounced in Kosovo, the poorest region of Yugoslavia.15 Protesters in Kosovo called for full 
autonomy from Serbia, a demand which was met with further repression from Serbian 
 
15 Richard Caplan, “International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo,” International Affairs 74, no. 4 (October 1, 
1998), 751. 
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authorities. In 1982, Serbia increased its military and surveillance presence in Kosovo as 
hundreds of Kosovar Albanians were arrested for involvement in the riots and conspiring against 
the Serbian state.16 Nationalist sentiment was also growing in Serbia, with increasing public calls 
for Kosovo to be officially united with Serbia under the total control of the Serbian government.  
In 1988, Serbia brought in its own officials to take over leadership of Kosovo, 
Montenegro, and Vojvodina. Kosovo lost its provisional autonomy guaranteed by the Yugoslav 
arrangement after changes made to the Serbian constitution in 1990 which declared Serbia a 
“democratic state of the Serbian people” rather than a state consisting of a Serb nation with other 
sovereign nations. In the same year, the elected members of Kosovo’s parliament declared 
sovereignty from Serbia after they were barred entry to the assembly building by Serb forces.17 
This sovereignty was bipartite in that it maintained that the Yugoslav republic would have 
ultimate jurisdiction, but also that Serbia would no longer have any control of Kosovar 
institutions or territory. The province held a referendum on independence the next year and 
elected a new government, led by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in 1992.18 This 
government also attempted to establish its own armed forces as part of its parallel system of 
governance, but the KLA suppressed these efforts as it would threaten their consolidation of 
military power in the territory.19 
Outside of Kosovo, the republic of Yugoslavia was in disarray. The sources of the 
breakup of Yugoslavia are debated, but many point to the death of Tito as well as the increasing 
economic hardships plaguing the daily lives of Yugoslav citizens. In 1988, the federal parliament 
 
16 Weller, Peace Lost: The Failure of Conflict Prevention in Kosovo. 
17 Marc Weller, Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence, 38-39. 
18 Ibid., 30. 
19 Jaume Castan Pinos, Kosovo and the Collateral Effects of Humanitarian Intervention (London: Routledge, 2018), 
26. 
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of Yugoslavia resorted to privatization and decreased socialist property rights in order to respond 
to the country’s economic problems; however, these measures were not enough to overcome 
rising inflation and pressure from creditors, and in December of the same year the Prime 
Minister chose to implement a “shock therapy” program at the behest of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The Yugoslav dinar was stabilized, but as a result the country’s growth, 
production, and employment rates decreased.20 This exacerbated the existing tensions in the 
region and paved the way for the spread of nationalist ideology across Yugoslavia.  
The incitement of nationalist rhetoric was especially common in the final years of the 
Yugoslav state. Serbian political messaging in the late 1980s centered around the “Kosovo myth” 
which referenced a 14th century battle of a Serb Orthodox army against an Ottoman conquest. As 
historian Marie-Janine Calic describes: 
The religiously laden myth supported the Serbs in that it bestowed legitimacy on their 
cause that far surpassed all political arguments and justifications. In this decade, the 
Serbs were often referred to as a “heavenly people,” and this image became a pivotal 
figure in their discourse… The narrative of the eternal battle for freedom and self-
determination communicated a hope for salvation, encouraged Serbs to reassert their own 
identity, and helped mobilize and emotionalize the masses. Moreover, the religious 
overtones distinguished the Serbs from the Albanians, their rivals for what was seen as 
the embattled holy land Kosovo.21  
 
The myth of Kosovo was exploited as a political tool by Milošević, whose 1989 public speech on 
the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo serves as a testament to the rhetorical battles which 
marked the final days of Yugoslavia: “Today it is difficult to say what is the historical truth 
about the Battle of Kosovo and what is legend. Today this is no longer important.”22 The speech 
is remembered for its foreshadowing of violence due to Milošević’s reference to the “armed 
 
20 Calic, A History of Yugoslavia, 285.  
21 Ibid., 278. 
22 National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce of the U.S., “Slobodan Milosevic’s 1989 
St. Vitus Day Speech,” June 28, 1989, 
https://cmes.arizona.edu/sites/cmes.arizona.edu/files/3g.%20SLOBODAN%20MILOSEVIC_speech_6_28_89.pdf. 
 15 
battles” that Serbia would need to be prepared for, but this line of the speech is more prophetic in 
its acknowledgement that the reality, or rather what Milošević made reality, of the conflicts in 
the Balkans would not be solved by the rationalism and pragmatism of diplomatic peace talks. 
Milošević was committed to the creation of a new truth, a new history, and a new system for 
Yugoslavia, one which did not depend on the approval of Europe or the West, but the 
commitment of the Serbs to restore Serbia to transhistorical glory. 
In 1990, Slovenia and Croatia declared unilateral independence and left the Yugoslav 
structure, triggering both violence from the Serb-controlled government of Yugoslavia and 
increased attention from the international community. The Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) established by the Helsinki Act in 1975––renamed the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995––positioned itself to 
emerge as a “pan-European crisis management mechanism” after the declarations of 
independence; within a few days, the CSCE proposed the launching of an official mission to 
Yugoslavia, which Milošević rejected. The EU, known at the time as the European Community 
(EC),23 also moved into the realm of regulating foreign affairs, supporting Slovenia and Croatia 
in their independence from the FRY in an August 1991 statement: 
The European Community and its member States are dismayed at the increasing violence 
in Croatia. They remind those responsible for the violence of their determination never to 
recognize changes of frontiers which have not been brought about by peaceful means and 
by agreement… The Community and its member States call on the Federal Presidency 
[of Yugoslavia] to put an immediate end to this illegal use of the forces at its command.24 
 
 
23 The EC consisted of three international organizations, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), and the European Economic Community (EEC), and served as the 
precursor to the EU which was founded in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty. For more on the transition from the EC to 
the EU, see: Alasdair Blair, The European Union since 1945 (Harlow, England: Pearson/Longman, 2005). 
24 European Commission Declaration on Yugoslavia, August 27, 1991, EPC Press Release, 82-91. 
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The EC also deployed its European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), the first attempt 
by Europe to instigate a foreign presence, in July 1991. Unarmed monitors were sent by the EC 
to the Balkans in white suits in order to observe the rising tensions in the region.25 Five of the 
monitors were killed by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in January 1992, dampening the 
credibility of the EC as a well-equipped actor in crisis management.26 The EC followed its 
statement against the illegal use of force with the EC Conference on September 7, 1991, with the 
leadership of Lord Carrington. The conference and its resulting “peace plan,” however, only 
allowed for independence for nations which were republics under the former Yugoslav system.27 
Kosovo was also ignored during the EC’s London Conference in August 1992 which was 
designed to diplomatically solve the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.28 
During the Croatian and Bosnian crises, Serbian officials continued to increase 
restrictions and ethnic targeting towards Kosovar Albanians. Initially, this included removing 
ethnic Albanians from government offices and restricting Kosovar nationals who emigrated from 
the region from retaining their status as native Kosovars.29 War officially began in 1998 when 
Serbian forces led a large-scale ethnic cleansing campaign under the command of Milošević. 
This triggered another round of international attention on the region following the recent 
conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The conflict in Kosovo was internationally relevant 
 
25 Later became known as “ice cream suits.” Weller, Contested Statehood, 43. 
26 Ana E. Juncos, “The ‘Hour of Europe’? Struggling for Peace in the Balkans,” in EU Foreign and Security Policy 
in Bosnia (Manchester University Press, 2013), 68. 
27 Second Carrington Draft Provisions for a Convention, 1 November 1991, in Weller, Crisis in Kosovo, 80.  
28 The President of the parallel government in Kosovo at the time was “invited” to express his views at the 
Conference, “If [he is] planning to be in London at the time of the Conference… the organizers will set up a ‘Salle 
d’écoute’ to which the formal Conference proceedings will be relayed live.” The room was visited from time to time 
during the proceedings by Lord Carrington and other notables of the EC, but the question of Kosovo was never 
really discussed. Found in Weller, Contested Statehood, 48. 
29 Marc Weller, “The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,” International Affairs 75, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 211–51, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00069. 
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due to humanitarian concerns about ethnic cleansing and the perception that violence (and 
refugees) could once again break out on Europe’s borders. 
Much of this fear was fueled by a characterization of the Balkan conflicts as based on 
“ancient hatreds.” The terminology echoes a colonial refrain in which local populations are 
portrayed as naturally prone to violence and conflict.30 The conflict in Kosovo was not defined 
by identity or exceptionalism but was in fact similar to many conflicts in that it regarded territory 
and sovereignty as its central points of contention. However, the international community did not 
understand the conflict as one of many similar outbreaks of violence. There were fears at the 
time that the war in Kosovo, a territory on the doorstep of the EC, could provoke a large-scale 
contestation of the new post-Cold War, peace-centered order. 
To respond to these fears, NATO met repeatedly throughout 1998 and 1999 in order to 
develop an international plan of action in response to Milošević’s aggression towards the ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo. Airstrikes were first authorized by NATO on 13 October 1998, in order to 
push Milošević to cooperate with the demands of the international community. The airstrikes 
were not used at the time, but their threat persisted as a deterrent against the continued use of 
force in Kosovo, though this was unsuccessful. The international community gathered to respond 
at Château Rambouillet in Paris; these talks included Russia, which was generally supportive of 
Serbian control over Kosovo. Russia attempted to thwart any effort at an agreement that would 
be enforced by NATO or the U.S., while France and Italy moved to push for NATO direction 
rather than leadership from the UN Security Council (UNSC).31 Milošević was not present at the 
meetings in Rambouillet and neither was the President of Kosovo. Milošević’s logic of not 
 
30 See: Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media (New York: 
Routledge, 2014). 
31 Weller, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo," 212. 
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attending was to debase the meaning and efficacy of the meetings which he viewed as an 
overreach on behalf of the international powers. The President of Kosovo was replaced by 
leaders of the KLA which had become more forceful and extreme during the war, attempting to 
take over the administration of the state along with its military capacities.32 
After the Rambouillet conference, the Western powers made clear that Serbia would face 
retaliation if it did not make concessions. Serbia nonetheless rejected the Rambouillet Agreement 
and ramped up military aggression in Kosovo, increasing the scale of the conflict, deaths, and the 
number of displaced persons.33 The OSCE mission in Kosovo was withdrawn, and on March 23, 
NATO began a 78-day airstrike campaign, not against any one enemy as the Secretary General 
stated, but against the broad threat that Serbia posed to international security. 
 
32 Ibid., 227. 
33 Ibid., 236. 
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      Source: United Nations, Map No. 4069 Rev. 6, 2011. 
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Kosovo’s Colonial Situation 
In his article on the ramifications of the Rambouillet Conference of 1999, former legal 
adviser to the Kosovo delegation and legal scholar Marc Weller identifies the clashing principles 
of territorial integrity and self-determination as the source of international confusion on the 
status of Kosovo. Both principles rely on each other as states need to create the ability to hold 
power over their citizens (self-determination) and the borders in which their power can be 
exercised (territorial integrity). In the Kosovo conflict, Serbia aimed to maintain territorial 
integrity over Kosovo; Kosovo’s goal was to seize its right to self-determination. Both principles 
were enshrined in international institutions and treaties. However, the states in the international 
system held a vested interest in controlling who could and could not be given the right to self-
determination due to the power that a sovereign state could exercise. If every ethnic group was to 
gain the right to self-determination, the existing states would be less powerful. As Weller writes: 
[Self-determination] is not a right appertaining to a self-constituting people, but instead 
applies to territorial entities defined through colonial administration to which a 
population is attached in a more or less incidental way. And the right is to be exercised 
only once, at the point of decolonization.34  
 
By drawing the line once, the nation-states already established at the time of the Helsinki Act or 
the UN Charter could maintain their set distinctions and prevent any secessionist movements in 
the established territorial boundaries. Kosovo does not, therefore, have a right to self-
determination due to its lack of colonial history, at least as colonialism is defined by the 
international community.   
After the 1999 war in Kosovo, a community of unelected officials acting on behalf of 
international organizations occupied the capital city of Pristina and oversaw the creation and 
administration of the new state. The breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s provided a testing site 
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for one of the most extensive efforts in nation-building undertaken by the relatively novel 
formation of international institutions such as the EU, UN, OSCE, and NATO. The end of the 
Bosnian war in 1994 was primarily negotiated by the United States and the EU, and it 
established a precedent for a permanent international presence.35 The 1999 War of Independence 
ended similarly, with peace reached not as a result of one side winning over the other as in a 
traditional war, but as the result of NATO’s airstrike campaign which made the cost of war too 
high to continue. The combination of a) the inability to declare a “winner” in the war other than 
NATO and b) the international interest in proving that its foreign policy could be effective on its 
own doorstep created the necessary conditions for the case of disaster colonialism.  
In 1999, after the NATO bombing campaign led to an end of the War of Independence, 
the UNSC established Resolution 1244 and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which the 
UNSC bestowed with essentially all governmental powers regarding the administration of the 
Kosovar state until the mission could “complete” its mandate. Such a completion, however, 
would be arbitrary due to the vague nature of the mandate itself. The language of the Resolution 
contained acknowledgements of Kosovo’s autonomy while emphasizing the importance of 
human rights and international security. It further established that the UN Secretary General 
would be given the authority to put into place an interim civil administration. The terms used— 
“performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required”, “maintaining 
civil law and order”, “protecting and promoting human rights”— designate a relation in which 
UNMIK has the authority to define the terms of power. When would it decide where human 
rights were not protected? What standard is used for maintaining civil law and order? These 
 
35 Peter Siami-Davies, “Introduction,” in International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995 (New York, New 
York: Routledge, 2003), 19. 
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questions begged by the resolution are not flaws or holes missed during the planning of UNMIK 
but are specifically designed to be unanswerable. 
Further, Resolution 1244 established the International Civilian Office and the position of 
International Civilian Representative (ICR) for Kosovo in 1999 to oversee the mandate in 
place.36 It also created KFOR, a longstanding NATO force in Kosovo whose mission continues 
today. The EU established their own special representative, the EU Special Representative 
(EUSR) to Kosovo, a position which continues to exist at the time of this paper.37 The EU also 
launched the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in 2008, after Kosovo 
officially declared its independence as a sovereign state. The mission is the largest civilian 
mission run under the European Common Defense and Security Policy (CDSP). EULEX acted as 
an official court in Kosovo with full judicial powers. As the European Council outlined in the 
body’s official mandate, EULEX was to:  
… assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in 
their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and 
strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and 
customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and 
adhering to internationally recognised standards and European best practice.38  
 
Further, the rule of law mission did not stop at the courts; to ensure that “European best 
practices” could be followed, the mission also established a police unit and a customs unit, each 
of which was to be “co-located where appropriate with the Kosovo [Police/Customs] Service.”39 
 
36 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244, June 10, 1999. 
37 Council of the European Union, “Kosovo: Tomáš Szunyog Appointed as New EU Special Representative,” July 
30, 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/07/30/kosovo-tomas-szunyog-appointed-
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38 European Union, “Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, 
EULEX Kosovo,” February 4, 2008. 
39 Council of the European Union, Article 6, Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo, February 4, 2008. 
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In this configuration, the local authority was ignored in the calculation of good governance 
techniques. 
After 2008, UNMIK’s executive authority ended and the UNSC determined that the 
mandate had been fulfilled. However, the international community’s presence remains. At the 
time of this paper, the OSCE mission in Kosovo is active, the office of the EUSR is still used to 
impact Kosovo’s domestic policies and foreign relations, and NATO troops are still conducting 
their mission established in 1999 by Resolution 1244. EULEX is focusing on the “transition” to 
local authorities. Today, the focus of the international presence in Kosovo is on shaping the 
country economically––often referenced in terms of moral and social changes to the society––
into a state that can join the EU. The EU continues to remain neutral on Kosovo’s recognition; 
six of the EU member states will not recognize the region as independent for fear of supporting 
their own internal separatist movements.40 The EU continues to be the major international 
organization which holds power and influence over Kosovo, primarily through the EU accession 
process. This phase of EU power is what I will refer to as the “postcolonial” era of Kosovo’s 
history due to its entrance after the end of direct UN administration and the 2008 declaration of 
independence. 
In the case of Kosovo, disaster colonialism––a series of policies and actions designed to 
bypass popular will in favor of the implementation of the agenda of technocrats at the heads of 
international organizations––removed any power from the population of Kosovo to determine 
their own structures of government, economy, and society. This was made possible by the 
tumultuous conditions during and after the war, including the physical displacement of citizens. 
As a result, NATO could manufacture a “disaster” that would constantly need the expertise of 
 
40 Greiçevci, “EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo,” 295. 
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international actors to resolve it. The acceptance of the narrative of “disaster” by the 
international organizations made imperative that intervention was continuous even after the war 
was over. NATO’s creation and the UN and EU’s maintenance of the “disaster” is necessary in 
order to understand how the project is effective at every level of its operations, from local staff to 
heads of missions. The execution of disaster colonialism followed a self-justifying set of beliefs: 
the internationals were needed to prevent the outbreak of human rights abuses and violence, so 
any unsavory aspects of the missions could be justified by the necessity of their presence. Thus, 
from the moment of NATO intervention, the European outlook became the only possible 




Values and Territory: NATO Intervention in Kosovo 
 
In the second month of NATO’s 1999 Operation Allied Force (OAF) mission in Kosovo, 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited the office of NATO General Wesley K. Clark, 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The war which many believed would only require a brief 
use of force seemed at the time to be dragging on without end in sight. Blair’s meeting with 
Clark served as a stern reminder to the general that the future of every leader in Europe depended 
on the outcome of the air war against Serbia.41 As Blair had said elsewhere, the war in Kosovo 
was “a new kind of war, about values as much as territory.”42 This framing of the conflict is 
necessary to understand why the war was important for European leaders. Further, the 
importance of values explains why a conglomeration of Western liberal democracies, funded and 
supplied primarily by the U.S., would agree to spend between $20 million and $65 million a day 
for eleven weeks bombing a small, southeastern European country which had not attacked any 
alliance members nor their neighbors.43  
There was not a clear economic interest in Kosovo that might justify an international 
intervention like there may have been for Kuwait and its lucrative oil exports in the Gulf War of 
1990-91. There was, however, a fear that the conflict would cause a refugee crisis and possibly 
incite economic tensions in the surrounding countries.44 The territory of Kosovo was not useful 
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militarily to NATO either; NATO had already established bases around the Balkans and Eastern 
Europe.45 The proximity of Kosovo to Europe was important, however, insofar as rising conflict 
on the outskirts of Europe would reflect on the region as a whole. With the end of the Cold War 
and the recent formation of the EU and OSCE as institutions which would deal with post-conflict 
situations, the existence of state violence on the continent served as a threat to the human-rights 
progress of the 20th century but also an avenue for a new foreign policy assemblage. Now that 
the threat of communism and conflict with the Soviet Union had ended, the war on European 
values began.   
Milošević’s ethnic cleansing and human rights abuses in Kosovo were thus perceived as a 
danger to the new status quo of liberal-democratic peace in Europe. The Balkan wars of the 
1990s were enough of a problem for the EC in terms of the visibility of crisis on the borders of 
Europe. It was therefore in NATO’s post-Cold War jurisdiction to intervene and maintain the 
liberal-democratic, humanitarian order that arose after the violence of World War II and 
ascertained dominance after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The NATO intervention 
provided the space for and necessitated the UN administration which governed Kosovo for eight 
years due to the path that it ended––independent self-determination––and created––international 
control and assistance–– in the territory. NATO’s humanitarian war was thus used to initiate 
disaster colonialism in Kosovo by creating a blank slate with its intervention. This would be used 
by the UN and the slew of international organizations which established missions in Kosovo to 
create their own programs, laws, and general structures of governance and power for Kosovo.  
Many government and lower-level NATO officials believed the use of force, however 
small, from the alliance would push Milošević to stop his ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo. 
 
45 Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, 
United States: RAND Corporation, 2001), 21.  
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On the other hand, top NATO officials had planned from the start a much more complicated and 
sustained campaign. The campaign’s implementation, however, was restricted by the allies’ 
insistence on a “clean war,” without collateral damage or NATO soldier casualties. Initially, 
officials were intentionally vague about the aims of OAF, not only to the press but also to their 
own subordinates, in an attempt to navigate the boundaries of “humanitarian warfare.” General 
Clark and NATO Lieutenant General Short often clashed regarding the nature of the strategic 
course of the war, leading to internal pressure as well as the external pressure from NATO 
country governments seeking minimal costs from the intervention.46 This led to constant 
compromises in choice of targets, particularly at the beginnings of the war. Lieutenant General 
Short, who privately pushed for more aggressive air tactics at the start of the campaign, 
identified one sole military objective which dominated the reasoning behind OAF: “to show 
NATO resolve.”47 At an early-stage briefing, one of Short’s subordinates remarked, “It seems to 
me that what we are doing is randomly bombing military targets with no coherent strategy, sir;” 
Short replied in the affirmative.48    
While it may have seemed as though the alliance was unprepared to engage in warfare, 
the plan for OAF was initiated via NATO directive in June 1998.49 Farther back in May of the 
same year, the U.S. had taken the initiative on Clark’s orders to start its own covert planning for 
 
46 “Short maintained that the most effective use of allied air power would be to pay little heed to dispersed Serbian 
forces in Kosovo and to concentrate instead on infrastructure targets in and around Belgrade, including key electrical 
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48 Ibid., 18.  
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an air operation against Serbia.50 By the start of the campaign, the final plan of operation selected 
consisted of three phases:  
In Phase I, NATO would strike antiaircraft defenses and command bunkers. Phase II 
would extend the strikes to Yugoslavia's infrastructure below the 44th parallel, well south 
of Belgrade. Only in Phase III would the alliance hit targets in the capital.51 
 
Many believed that Phase 1, the initial display of force, would be sufficient to stop Milošević and 
resume diplomatic negotiations due to the sheer power of NATO’s military capacity. However, 
those at the top of the NATO chain of command were prepared to escalate the aggressions if, as 
they suspected, Milošević did not surrender after the first 48 hours.52  
The first day of bombing on March 24, 1999 took place in four waves, using 214 U.S. 
and 130 allied aircraft. The first target was a military-communications tower located between the 
houses of ethnic Albanians in Pec, Kosovo. The building was struck from over 15,000 feet by a 
laser-guided missile with a camera lens at its tip that allowed it to focus on its target. The attack 
marked the first use of the American long-range B-2 stealth bombers as well as satellite-guided 
bombs. From the beginning, the NATO intervention in Kosovo differed from previous wars in its 
use of remote precision-strike warfare. The confluence of geospatial satellite, surveillance, and 
arms technology created the conditions for the optimal efficiency demanded by “humanitarian 
war.”  
The “clean warfare” used in Kosovo signaled the establishment of a new military 
paradigm: the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The RMA can be traced back to the 
Military-Technological Revolution (MTR), a military term which refers to the impact of 
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information technologies on warfare; the RMA was the resulting transformation in military 
strategy.53 At the fin-de-siècle, U.S. military experts emphasized the growing need to understand 
the implications of changes in technology in order to respond to emerging global threats. Writing 
about the RMA, the experts concluded: 
Considerable evidence suggests that commercial access to information—GPS readings, 
space-based imagery, and Internet data—could be transformed into military advantage 
thereby levelling the playing field between [the U.S.] and our potential opponents. Other 
dual-use technologies, for instance, those that would permit remote piloting of aerial 
vehicles, permit commercial technologies such as electronic video photography to act as 
powerful military tools accessible to all.54 
 
The lag between the hardware, the technology, and the software, or implementation structures, of 
the military concerned military theorists and strategists focused on the future of warfare. 
Although the U.S. had clear global technological supremacy with its ownership of advanced and 
abundant satellite systems as well as its data processing capabilities, the ability to adapt its 
technology to shifting conditions of conflict was still lacking: “There are vast differences 
between, for instance, access to meteorological imagery and determining, for instance, that a 
locus of operations is likely to be fogged in 24 hours hence…”55  
 The NATO intervention in Kosovo represented the first military operation which put the 
principles of the RMA into practice. It manifested the developments of the RMA, particularly on 
behalf of the U.S. military’s part in OAF. Some developments took place in real-time; initially 
NATO used traditional targets such as armed forces bases and aircraft carriers, reluctant to attack 
information centers. On the third night of the attacks, General Short commented that he 
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remembered “cancelling the second wave of F-117s because we were out of targets. Of the 91 
that we had been given, we had struck that target set.”56 After the first week of the attack, it was 
clear that NATO needed autonomous targeting capabilities, or at least the ability to choose and 
execute attacks on targets as quickly as possible. NATO General Joseph Ralston devised a 
document to be approved by the alliance which would give NATO greater authority to strike 
targets without obtaining approval. This included certain restrictions, particularly the 
requirement of NATO political agreement before bombing the electrical grid in Serbia:  
This turned out to be a legal question more than a strategic one. There were people who 
said ‘Take out the electrical grid, because the people in Serbia will get all upset and put 
pressure on Milošević, and that will help force him to withdraw.’ If you do that, though, 
it will be a war crime. If you bomb the electrical grid because it is supplying the 
electricity to the surface-to-air missile sites, that is a legal target. So the restriction was 
put on there for legal reasons.57 
By Phase 3 of the attack, the legal questions grew less important. NATO’s main targets in this 
phase were infrastructure, supply lines, bridges and transmitters. In early May 1999, the 
emphasis was on “industry and psychological targets,” which included the electrical grid. The 
bombing of the electrical grid would mean that NATO would be able to at least temporarily 
disable the power in Serbia and Kosovo, a measure which would severely impact the local 
population. In a press conference on May 3, NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea gave an 
announcement after NATO’s initial attack on the Serbian power grid: 
The fact that the lights went out across 70% of the country I think shows that NATO has 
its finger on the light switch in Yugoslavia now and we can turn the power off whenever 
we need to and whenever we want to, and we can use this to severely disrupt, degrade, 
diminish the capacity of the Yugoslav Armed Forces to operate over long periods of time, 
delay their ability to repair the essential power systems, and of course by disrupting in 
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To Shea, NATO, and the member states, the collateral damage which might come from the 
discontinuation of essential power and electricity for hospitals, homes, and commercial buildings 
were counterbalanced by the fact that the NATO pilots––who did not fly below 15,000 feet––
would be safer from anti-aircraft threats. 
The concern regarding the lives of NATO soldiers was important due to the negative 
effect that any death or deaths would have on public opinion regarding the air war in general.59 It 
was also partially related to the recent history of native losses during foreign interventions. In 
1990, former President George W. Bush, Sr. sent U.S. troops to Kuwait five days after Iraq 
invaded the country.60 While an air campaign would follow, Bush initially accepted the political 
risk of sending ground troops. He also sent 28,000 troops to Somalia in November of 1992, 
which Clinton reinforced once in office.61 This time, the risk bore deeper public consequences: 
Chilling pictures of dead and captured Americans were sent out by the few Western 
journalists in Mogadishu. Television footage on CNN showed a frightened, wounded 
Blackhawk helicopter pilot, identified by military officials here as Army Chief Warrant 
Officer Michael Durant, 32, under interrogation by his Somali captors. The officials said 
he was a member of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), based in 
Fort Campbell, Ky. A still photo showed Somalis watching as the body of an unidentified 
American was dragged through the streets at the end of a rope.62 
 
As a result, the impetus to prevent the use of ground troops increased following the events in 
Somalia. Accordingly, air power technology had evolved to allow for NATO “victory” against 
Serbia to take place without any physical soldiers in the territory. In fact, the only American 
deaths throughout the duration of OAF were two helicopter pilots who died during a training 
 
59 Blaine Harden, “CRISIS IN THE BALKANS: NEWS ANALYSIS; Surprising Lesson: Bombing Can Work,” A6.  
60 Thomas Houlahan, Gulf War: The Complete History (New London, New Hampshire: Schrenker Military 
Publishing, 1999), https://catalog.lib.unc.edu/catalog/UNCb3732032. 
61 Lester H. Brune, The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti, and 
Bosnia, 1992-1998 (Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1998), https://catalog.lib.unc.edu/catalog/UNCb4437800. 
62 R.W. Apple Jr., “Clinton Sending Reinforcements After Heavy Losses in Somalia: Clinton Sending 
Reinforcements After Heavy U.S. Loss in Somalia,” A1. 
 32 
accident.63 The humanitarian war was successful in its mission to save Kosovar Albanian lives 
without losing American lives by defeating the Yugoslav threat while simultaneously 
outsourcing the cause of any “collateral damage,” or civilian deaths, to Serb aggression. 
The official statements of NATO and its member nations regarding the situation in 
Kosovo reflected the idea that intervention was necessary, and further that it was provoked by 
Milošević due to his refusal to accept the compromises in various diplomatic talks. This framing 
was reinforced by the media narrative which accepted its central premise and its focus on 
Milošević. The dispatch from the New York Times in Belgrade on the first day of bombings read 
“U.S. Negotiators Depart, Frustrated by Milošević’s Hard Line,” supporting the inevitability of 
the attack due to Milošević’s lack of diplomatic prowess. The major media outlets of the West 
reported OAF as a humanitarian intervention, forming a consensus surrounding the nature of the 
conflict, the parties involved, and the necessary salvation which could only come from the 
satellite missiles and air power of NATO.  
The same narrative was often spread by academics of international law; as Jonathan 
Charney wrote in the October 1999 issue of the American Journal of International Law: “Many 
individuals on all sides of the Kosovo crisis maintained the highest standards of law and 
morality. Regrettably, others, particularly political leaders, fell short of their moral and/or legal 
obligations.”64 Charney goes on to identify the Serbian/FRY government and Milošević as those 
who “fell short” of their moral obligations, alluding to human rights crimes, as well as both the 
Albanian and Serb forces which committed “brutal actions” against each other. As Charney and 
others in the media chose to believe, there was no “moral” actor other than the international 
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experts who could save the Kosovar Albanians through their knowledge and efficacy in matters 
of governance. 
The Cable News Network (CNN), reticent to explain the complex power structure of 
Yugoslavia and the consequences of its dissolution to its viewers, resorted to the conventional 
narrative: that the 1999 War of Independence was simply another manifestation of centuries-old 
ethnic conflict.65 The obfuscation of the reality in Kosovo was not, however, merely for 
convenience. As political scientist Susan Woodward writes of the same pattern in the reporting 
on the earlier Yugoslav conflict of the early 1990s: 
…no amount of scholarship demonstrating the minimal explanatory power of the ethnic-
conflict label for contemporary civil violence, or the unsubstantiated nature of the 
distinction between ‘new’ and ‘old’ wars, has been able to penetrate this new world view 
of contemporary conflict, based largely on Western reactions to the Yugoslav case.66  
 
The reality was that this rhetoric of clashing identities was not only easier to use than the 
material roots of the war, but it was also directly useful to the international community’s colonial 
endeavor which needed saviors with the knowledge and rationality to keep peace among 
constantly sparring ethnicities. 
The ultimate demands of NATO and the countries involved in previous international 
diplomatic talks at Rambouillet in early 1999 were to have Milošević completely withdraw his 
troops from Kosovo and also establish an international peacekeeping presence in the region with 
“NATO at its core.”67 The final peace agreement did not include major demands which had been 
included in the final Rambouillet ultimatum deal; the deal was in fact congruent with what 
Milošević would have agreed to prior to the first bomb, and gave Milošević sovereignty over 
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Serbia without officially recognizing Kosovo as an independent nation-state.68 White House 
strategists commented after the end of the war on Clinton’s initial contention that the bombing 
was to prevent ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, conceding that it “was never really a 
practical goal. Bombing could neither protect the Kosovars… nor could it force out the Yugoslav 
armed forces.”69 
The rhetoric of the NATO countries’ military and political elite reveals greater insight 
into the aims of the intervention; on April 23, 1999, Bill Clinton gave a speech at the 
Commemorative Ceremony of the 50th anniversary of NATO in Washington, D.C. outlining the 
new future that the international institution could have after the Cold War. Kosovo was central to 
this future:  
We are in Kosovo because we want to replace ethnic cleansing with tolerance and 
decency, violence with security, disintegration with restoration, isolation with integration 
into the rest of the region and the continent. We want southeastern Europe to travel the 
same road as western Europe half a century ago, and central Europe a decade ago. But we 
are fundamentally there because the Alliance will not have meaning in the 21st century if 
it permits the slaughter of innocents on its doorstep. This is not a question of territorial 
conquest or political domination, but standing for the values that made NATO possible in 
the first place.70 
As Clinton’s statement makes clear, intervention in Kosovo served as a display of ethics. The 
ethics of clean war, and the ethics of an integrated West which was committed to “peace” and 
would begin wars to keep it. It was necessary to intervene in Kosovo, and to later establish an 
international presence in the region, so that the hegemony of Western ideals, or “the values that 
made NATO possible,” would not be threatened. 
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In this way, NATO intervention represented the forceful blow which was necessary to 
usher in disaster colonialism by UNMIK and the EU. Although NATO is explicitly a military 
organization, its function in the case of Kosovo served as a sort of creditor, guaranteeing that 
from the moment the first bomb was dropped on March 24, 1999, the problem of Kosovo would 
be taken out of the hands of regional governments and organizations and into the hands of the 
international community. The postwar condition of Kosovo was not one in which foreign 
occupation would be contested: much of the infrastructure of the country had been damaged or 
destroyed by the air campaign, and the threat of Serbian aggression had not left the 
consciousness of the Kosovar Albanians, nearly half of whom were displaced during the war.  
The intervention of NATO into the conflict between Kosovar Albanians and Serbia, 
while short in duration relative to the span of Yugoslav and Serbian rule as well as UN 
occupation, was a necessary precondition for the colonial project to come. The seizure of the 
local conflict by the international community started with NATO. The implementation of the 
international agenda, however, continued with UNMIK via direct government rule and later 
through the EU’s less direct approach of “normalization” and “Europeanization.” The 
overarching principle which defines all three eras––the 1999 war, 1999-2008 UN occupation, 
and post-2008 independence–– is the internationalization of Kosovo. I argue that this principle 
hinges on a colonial outlook towards the native population of Kosovo: that the problems of the 
ethnic Albanians and Serbs in the territory require Western values and the good governance 
techniques and expertise of the international community, and thus cannot be left to the local 
population to address for themselves. NATO removed Kosovo from the sovereignty debate once 
it won the war. Without a clear decision on sovereign status, the international community 
continued its experiment in state-building with the UN occupation and the staff of experts 
 36 
imported into the territory. In the postcolonial era, this colonial apparatus of governing 
organizations was able to effectively seize power over a territory by invoking the post-WWII 
rhetoric of human rights and conflict prevention. In the next section, I will discuss the colonial 




Disaster Colonialism: UNMIK’s Interim Administration 
 
The end of the NATO intervention was followed by the beginning of the UN’s disaster 
colonial regime in Kosovo. From 1999-2008, the UN held supreme legislative, executive, and 
judicial authority over Kosovo, creating a protectorate that was governed through international 
administration.71 Though the international community had initially intervened to prevent human 
rights abuses against the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, it would now be responsible for 
“prepar[ing] the province for substantial autonomy and self-government.”72 
The origins of international involvement in the conflict did not begin with NATO’s 
actions, but the intervention was a turning point which allowed for the colonial mission to take 
place. It established that the conflict was out of the control of Milošević, Kosovo President 
Ibrahim Rugova, the KLA, and other regional actors. Kosovo was, following the declaration of 
NATO intervention, in international hands. As it had done in Bosnia-Herzegovina only a few 
years prior, the international community coalesced around the new governance and peacekeeping 
project: Kosovo. Thousands of international staff members relocated to the new missions in 
Kosovo in the direct aftermath of the destruction from the 1999 war. Many Kosovar Albanians as 
well as Kosovar Serbs faced extreme brutalities during the war, including murder, assault, rape, 
and forced removal as part of the ethnic cleansing campaign. It was in this environment that the 
UN and other organizations stepped into Kosovo. UNMIK, the OSCE mission, the EU mission, 
and the permanent NATO presence combined to create the longest and most expansive 
trusteeship mission in history.73  
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Kosovo as a post-conflict site gave the international community a center to focus their 
operations. For some, like the EC/EU, state-building was a new field in which they could test 
their power and efficacy. If the post-conflict missions in Kosovo could be successful in creating 
a European-oriented, stable state, the international organizations could gain greater reputation 
and power in their global endeavors. Each major international organization was placed into 
separate spheres of operation termed “pillars.” Pillar I, “Humanitarian Affairs,” originally fell 
under the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN refugee agency, and was 
responsible for the return and replacement of refugees; Pillar II, “Civil Administration,” was run 
by the UN and consisted of daily administrative management of the territory; Pillar III, 
“Democratization and Institution Building,” was led by the OSCE; Pillar IV, “Economic 
Reconstruction,” fell under the jurisdiction of the EU.74 Each partition of tasks made clear the 
primary objectives of UNMIK in terms of the type of society it aimed to create in Kosovo: a 
human rights-respecting, bureaucratic, and democratic government (UNHCR, UN, OSCE) as 
well as an investment-friendly market economy (EU).  
This level of state-building had not been undertaken before by the UN, making Kosovo 
the site of the largest modern experiment in government planning and control. The “disaster” of 
the 1999 war provided the grounds for this colonial experiment, the purpose of which was to 
prove the efficacy and hegemony of the liberal-democratic humanitarian style of “good 
governance” and development. In this section, I will trace the points in which UN’s disaster 
colonialism, administered by technocratic governance experts, reveals the costs of occupation 
and the collateral damage that is part of the state-building mission. 
 
independence and Indonesia had relinquished sovereignty over their territory–– and for a four-year period. William 
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The International Commission on Kosovo’s 2000 report on the Kosovo crisis found that 
the intervention was “illegal but legitimate… because the intervention had the effect of liberating 
the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.”75 The 
uncertainty surrounding the legality and morality of NATO’s actions in Kosovo was quelled by 
this consensus, paving the way for the international community’s colonial project to establish its 
roots in Kosovo. The UN was able to establish UNMIK without request from Kosovo, bypassing 
its traditional insistence on consensual missions due to the “urgency” of the post-conflict 
situation which made its power as a humanitarian organization necessary, at least according to 
the international community.76  
The international community worked to control and shape the people and society of 
Kosovo, implementing Western governance and economic styles, while working against and 
around the very systems that they implemented. The difference between the colonialism of “old” 
and the disaster colonialism of the UN in Kosovo is that the UN’s hypocrisy between its rhetoric 
and action was due to its prevailing belief in its own mission rather than an ulterior motive to 
attain economic wealth. Those in charge of UNMIK and international organizations in Kosovo 
could accept the fact that many of their policies went against European and international legal 
conventions––some costs were necessary, according to their logic, in order to build a stable state 
for the people of Kosovo. It is this axiom, I argue, which guided UNMIK and other missions in 
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Kosovo and which made colonialism possible as a humanitarian system of governance in the 21st 
century. 
The NATO intervention in Serbia and Kosovo was officially terminated on June 9, 1999 
when NATO and the FRY government signed the Kumanovo Technical Agreement in 
Kumanovo, Macedonia. The document created a framework for the dispelling of Serb troops 
from Kosovo and for the establishment of a NATO security presence in the province.77 However, 
in terms of addressing the roots of the territorial conflict, the agreement was much weaker than 
the Rambouillet Agreement. Milošević rejected the Rambouillet Agreement before the war 
began largely because of its proposal that a referendum on the issue of independence would be 
carried out after three years of foreign international intervention in Kosovo. The Kumanovo 
Agreement focused more on the establishment of an international administration rather than on 
questions of popular will or sovereignty. Prior to international intervention, the KLA aimed to 
gain national sovereignty and independence for Kosovo; this was, however, irreconcilable with 
the goals of the North Atlantic organizations. As Ray Murphy writes, “The ultimate goal of the 
KLA was independence, but this was inconsistent with European Union and United States 
policy. The latter considered that political autonomy and guaranteed minority rights formed the 
only internationally acceptable solution to the status of Kosovo.”78 This is in line with the 
aforementioned limitations of the existing state system on the ability of Kosovo to achieve 
meaningful sovereignty. 
The Kumanovo Technical Agreement focused on the security apparatuses in Kosovo and 
established that: 
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1. An international civil mission would be deployed by the UN under a Security Council 
resolution 
2. The international security force KFOR, under the command of NATO, would be 
deployed in Kosovo and “operate without hindrance” to establish and maintain security 
for the citizens of Kosovo 
3. All Yugoslav and/or Serbian military forces would be removed in a phased withdrawal 
plan from Kosovo as well as the Air Safety Zone and the Ground Safety Zone.79 The 
forces would not be allowed to enter, reenter, or remain within these zones.80 
 
The agreement established NATO’s sole authority over the use of force in Kosovo. The 
following day, the UN would establish sole governing authority in the region. On June 10, 1999, 
the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1244 under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.81 Article 11 of the Resolution gave UNMIK its main objectives: 
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:  
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial 
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the 
Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);  
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as 
required;  
(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including 
the holding of elections;  
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative 
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local 
provisional institutions and other peace- building activities;  
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, 
taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);  
(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional 
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;  
(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 
reconstruction;  
 
79 The Air Safety Zone is a 25-kilometer zone extending beyond the borders of Kosovo and includes the airspace of 
the zone. The Ground Safety Zone is a five-kilometer zone extending beyond Kosovo into FRY territory and 
includes the terrain in the zone. 
80 “Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (‘KFOR’) and the Governments of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia” (NATO, June 9, 1999), 
https://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm. 
81 The resolution was adopted with broad consensus; only China abstained from the vote. 
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(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, 
humanitarian and disaster relief aid;  
(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and 
meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;  
(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;  
(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons 
to their homes in Kosovo;  
Resolution 1244 was the legal basis for the UN’s power in Kosovo. It ensured that the 
functions of Kosovo’s society as well as the design of its future would be in the hands of 
international staff. The scope of the mission was unprecedented; with no clear terminating 
clause, UNMIK would be responsible for both administration over Kosovo as well as the 
facilitation of the territorial dispute.82 In the span of two days, Kosovo lost local authority to self-
govern as well as establish its own armed forces.  
The Resolution was seen as the ex post facto endorsement of the NATO intervention––
the subject of legal and ethical debates on foreign intervention and sovereignty among 
international law experts––by the UNSC which had not initially approved the intervention.83 
However, some scholars of international law who did not accept the humanitarian premise of the 
NATO intervention also questioned the legal validity of post-intervention involvement in 
Kosovo. They argued that the Kumanovo Agreement, which Resolution 1244 refers to as part of 
its legal basis, was made in violation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which 
states that “a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in 
violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”84 
 
82 Alexandros Yannis, “The UN as Government in Kosovo,” Global Governance 10, no. 1 (2004), 67. See also 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s analysis of the temporality of colonial rule for possible links to historical colonialism. Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
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84 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 52, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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The crux of the critical argument centered on the use of unsanctioned force by NATO which was 
in violation of the UN Charter. Legal debates notwithstanding, the UN mission was able to 
expand its legal and executive reach after the passage of Resolution 1244.  
 Per Article 11 of Resolution 1244, UNMIK was to transfer its executive capacities over 
time to the local government by establishing democratic institutions and elections for the 
territory. The transition to local ownership proved to be less important to the mission in the first 
years of operation, however. Only a month after the adoption of Resolution 1244, the mission 
began to unilaterally issue legislative acts and executive orders.85 This campaign was led by the 
Secretary General Special Representative, a UN envoy position.86 The SRSG was an appointee 
of the UNSC who was to “control the implementation of the international civil presence, and … 
coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate 
towards the same goals…”87 The SRSG served as the head of the mission and the executive 
authority on all other international missions, making the position the single most powerful in the 
governing of Kosovo.  
Neither the Kumanovo Agreement nor Resolution 1244 addressed the territorial dispute 
at the core of the conflict. The Resolution in fact recognized Kosovo as part of FRY, though it 
called for “substantial autonomy” for Kosovo, essentially placing the country back into the 
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political situation which led to the 1999 War of Independence. The UN was to be responsible for 
many of the processes which would decide the fate of Kosovo, and one of its most important 
roles was to facilitate diplomatic talks between Pristina and Belgrade on the question of 
independence. However, the organization’s primary organ, the UNSC, was itself divided on this 
question: Russia and China maintained that Kosovo was part of Serbia, while the UK, U.S., and 
France supported Kosovo’s independence. Further, many countries in the UN did not recognize 
Kosovo for fear of encouraging their own domestic separatist movements. One of the mission’s 
central tenets could not be approached by the UN itself, let alone fulfilled by the peacekeeping 
mission.88  
On July 25, 1999, UNMIK established Regulation 1999/1, giving all legislative and 
executive authority as well as the administration of the judiciary in Kosovo to its own structures. 
The regulation invested these authorities in the SRSG who had ultimate exercising power.89 In 
this way, not only did the UN prevent any local input on governance, but it also refrained from 
allowing power to be exercised in a diffuse way among its staff in Kosovo. The issues of popular 
sovereignty and democracy, though given special respect in the UN Charter and international 
conventions, seemed to be a foregone conclusion in the UN’s post-Cold War peacekeeping 
mission style. It is this disregard and simultaneous reputation for setting standards of governance 
which made it possible for the UN to have such a high level of control over Kosovar society: 
At the time of its deployment, the transitional administration functions of UNMIK made 
it one of the most complex and ambitious operations that the United Nations had ever un-
dertaken. UNMIK’s responsibilities extended well beyond peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing to comprise an exceptionally wide range of governance functions. So broad was the 
scope of UNMIK’s authority—encompassing plenary executive, legislative, and judicial 
authority—that UNMIK can be said to belong to a sui generis class of operations (soon to 
include the UN mission in East Timor) sometimes referred to as “neo-trusteeships,” ‘in-
 
88 Koops, 623. 
89 UNMIK, "On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo," Regulation No. 1999/1. S/1999/987. July 
25, 1999. https://undocs.org/en/S/1999/987. 
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ternational protectorates,’ and, more accurately, ‘international territorial administra-
tions.90 
 
UNMIK was to be responsible for governance in Kosovo and for the transition to local 
authority, yet it expressly denied and inhibited many of the values, principles, and structures 
which it aimed to impose on the Kosovar people. The mission was centered around the power of 
the SRSG who was given complete authority to appoint any member of his or her office, 
essentially utilizing an executive cabinet-style government to rule over the territory rather than a 
democratic structure. The position of SRSG became increasingly powerful, moving from “basic 
civil administration functions” to all administrative functions including those of the law, 
commerce, security, currency, etc.  
In order for the UN to claim sole legal, executive and judicial authority, it refrained from 
the outright denial of the existence of local parallel structures and preventing any locals from 
holding political power in Kosovo––a tactic which may have caused the political elite in Kosovo 
to mobilize against the mission. UN Regulation 1/2000 established the Agreement on a Kosovo-
UNMIK Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) which agreed that the three major 
political parties in Kosovo would share administrative responsibility over Kosovo. The JIAS 
gave the local political parties some authority, but the regulation required that all official parallel 
structures would have to be abolished. As the regulation articulated: 
Current Kosovo structures, be they executive, legislative or judicial (such as the 
“Provisional Government of Kosovo,” Presidency of the Republic of Kosovo”) shall be 
transformed and progressively integrated, to the extent possible and in conformity with 
this agreement, into the Joint Interim Administrative Structure.91 
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For UNMIK, it was necessary to end all threats to its governing legitimacy by integrating any 
local government into its mission. There could not be structures which claimed to “exercise 
public authority in Kosovo” outside of its mission, or else it would not be as effective or 
powerful. Additionally, the implementation plan for the legislation banned:  
…issuance of “official documents,” certificates or registration plates; appointments of 
personnel for ‘official’ posts; collection of customs/taxes and license fees; policing/law 
and order activities; wearing of ‘official’ uniforms, carrying of ‘official identity cards, or 
otherwise impersonating officials’; ‘official’ contacts/negotiations with UNMIK and 
KFOR/international representatives; and occupying public buildings.92 
 
The issue of self-administration was not seriously addressed until the first municipal 
elections in October 2000. Later in May 2001, UNMIK also allowed the formation of a 120-seat 
Kosovar assembly, nonetheless requiring quotas for ethnic representation: ten seats for Serbs and 
ten seats for other minorities.93 The assembly would elect a president, who would then choose a 
prime minister. The structure was modeled after the European parliament systems with the 
special addendum of assembly ethnic quotas to reiterate the importance of the ethnic-tension 
narrative as justification for foreign involvement in the region.  
 Though the European style of governance was used in the assembly and governmental 
structure in Kosovo, European legal conventions were shifted to fit the needs of UNMIK and 
other international organizations in Kosovo. Regulation 2000/47 provided immunity for both 
UNMIK and KFOR members, ensuring that they would not be subject to local laws and the 
judicial system for any official actions.94 This was in accordance with previous international 
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conventions which established immunity for those involved in UN or other diplomatic relations. 
However, this strict observance of immunity over all other considerations undermined the 
mission’s supposed purpose––if the primary impetus for intervention and occupation was to 
prevent crimes against humanity, how could the international staff be given protection from the 
same standards of culpability that were applied against Milošević?95 The issue of diplomatic 
immunity was used by the UN to prevent prosecution against the mission after a group of Roma 
activists filed an official complaint in 2008 on behalf of 138 Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian 
victims in Kosovo.96 In 1999, over 600 members of the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian ethnic 
groups in Kosovo had been placed by the UN into refugee camps set up on land which was 
known to be prone to health risks as it was located next to a coal mining complex. A report by 
the Human Rights Watch found that the area contained highly toxic levels of lead, leading to 
miscarriages, premature births, increased seizures and cognitive/behavioral disabilities in 
children.97 For many in the camps, the lead exposure caused lifelong symptoms and medical 
conditions. The UN did not take action to move the refugees until 2005, and no official amends 
have been made regarding the complaint due to the legal protection enjoyed by UN staff.98 
 Though the staff of UNMIK and other international organizations could not be 
prosecuted in courts of law, they were still responsible for establishing the courts in Kosovo. 
After the first year of the UNMIK project, the UN created and staffed a judicial system, but the 
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efficiency and transparency of the courts were questionable. UNMIK had initially utilized an 
“Emergency Judicial System” from June to December 1999 while it struggled to find qualified 
judges. The judges that were hired during this time earned less than half of the salaries of 
UNMIK drivers and interpreters.99 In a case in Pec, Kosovo, a judge requested that a case 
involving a former prominent KLA member be dropped from his docket for fear of his own 
safety.100 The UN could not remove the judicial system from its environment, and UNMIK did 
not take measures to address the root of such security concerns. The KLA had a symbiotic 
relationship with UNMIK. This translated to direct political power for the group during and after 
the UN administration.101 
 The most powerful and repeated threat to the judicial system, however, did not come 
from the KLA but from the SRSG. A series of events during the 1999-2008 period exemplify the 
contradictions between the stated goals of UNMIK––implementation of democracy, autonomy, 
self-government––and the executive actions of the SRSG. In 2000, during the case of Afrim 
Zeqiri, then-SRSG Bernard Kouchner repeatedly denied court rulings in favor of his own 
dictums of guilt. In May 2000, Zeqiri voluntarily turned himself into authorities after an arrest 
order was made for him. He was a suspect for the murder of three Serbs and attempted murder of 
two others. After nearly two months in detention, the international investigating judge ordered 
his release as it was found that there were no grounds to proceed with the prosecution. The next 
day, the SRSG issued an executive order to continue Zeqiri’s detention for another 30 days, 
which he renewed again at the end of the order. “On the request of an international investigating 
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prosecutor, the international judge issued a decision permitting extension of detention without 
specifying the exact detention period or providing any information about available legal 
remedies to challenge the detention time.”102 After the judge’s clearance, Kouchner issued two 
more executive orders to prevent the “threat that the accused posed to public safety,” invoking 
the notion of preventive detention which is prohibited as grounds for detention by international 
human rights conventions.103  
This practice of preventive detention was repeated against Cele Gashi, Avdyl Behluli, 
and Jusuf Veliu in the case regarding the bombing of the Nis Express bus where ten people were 
killed by a remote-controlled bomb as the bus traveled from Gracanica, Kosovo to Nis, Serbia. 
The individuals were detained without legal basis and stayed in custody due to the use of 
multiple consecutive executive orders.104 The repeated interference in the judicial system by the 
SRSG was criticized, leading to the issuance of a regulation establishing an international 
commission for the review of extrajudicial detentions.105 This commission, however, was marked 
by problems of clarity, independence, and impartiality.106 
 In another case of executive overreach, this time involving restrictions on freedom of 
speech, the SRSG used executive orders against Dita, the daily Kosovo newspaper publication, 
to temporarily shut down the newspaper’s operations. Dita had published an article on April 27, 
2000 containing a photograph of an UNMIK employee of Serbian ethnicity, Petar Topoljski, 
along with allegations that he was engaged with criminal activities against Kosovar Albanians 
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during the war. Topoljski was found dead two weeks after the publication of the article. In the 
wake of the murder, the newspaper stated that it had attempted to warn UNMIK about the 
employee and his background, but that UNMIK failed to take action.107 On June 3rd, SRSG 
Kouchner issued an executive order ordering the newspaper to close for eight days, claiming that 
the publication violated the spirit of Resolution 1244.108 Kouchner bypassed all judicial process 
in order to reprimand the publication for its role as a possible aid to vigilantes. Within a few 
weeks, Kouchner went further and enacted Regulation 2000/37 on the “Conduct of Print Media 
in Kosovo,” a regulation which was to govern the behavior of broadcast and print media, limiting 
their freedoms of speech–– a direct contrast to the stated values of the democratic structures the 
mission was to implement and the general respect of the international organizations for 
journalistic freedom. The regulation created the role of a Temporary Media Commissioner 
(TMC) who was responsible for creating and enforcing a regulatory regime for Kosovo media by 
imposing sanctions on owners, operators, publishers, and editors who did not “refrain from 
publishing personal details of any person, including name, address of place of work, if 
publication of such details would pose a serious threat to the life, safety or security of any such 
person through vigilance or otherwise.”109 The TMC was given free rein to determine such 
violations and impose sanctions.  
 UNMIK’s manipulation of executive power was not limited to SRSG Bernard Kouchner; 
in October 2004, SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen issued an executive decision to cancel the tender 
process of the mobile phone provider Mobikos. Mobikos and the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority had signed a contract together awarding Mobikos tender for mobile 
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telephone service in Kosovo. The SRSG claimed that the process was flawed and would 
negatively impact Kosovo’s “ability to attract investment,” rejecting the contract.110 The TRA 
continued with the scheduled contract, noting that the process had followed standard European 
practices. The Municipal Court in Pristina had ruled that the contract was legally valid, 
supporting the TRA. UNMIK responded with a statement soon after which declared the 
agreement null and void, referencing the earlier executive decision.111 The Mobikos ordeal was 
significant in that it exemplified the willingness of UNMIK to directly override the judicial 
system that it had helped put into place. For UNMIK, this was necessary according to the 
economic logic which they used to justify the decision; canceling the contract “was necessary in 
the best interests of Kosovo and its economic development, in particular its ability to attract 
investment.”112 The concern for Kosovo was at the core of what invalidated the local judicial 
decision––in essence, the international government had to intervene to protect the people from 
themselves. 
 As mentioned previously, the disaster colonialism of UNMIK relied on the vulnerability 
of the local population to acquiesce to the takeover of control. In 2004, the expected 
acquiescence was challenged when the Kosova Action Network (KAN), an activist group in 
Pristina, protested against Resolution 1244 and protested for Kosovo’s independence from both 
Serbia and the UN.113 Later in June of 2005, activists from the KAN organized a protest against 
the presence of UNMIK again, writing the slogan “No negotiations, Self-Determination” on the 
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walls of UNMIK buildings in Kosovo. Kosovo and UN police arrested, jailed, and convicted 
hundreds of people linked to the protest, including Albin Kurti, the founder of KAN who would 
later become the head of “Vetëvendosja,” the self-determination party in Kosovo and the prime 
minister of Kosovo for a period in 2020.114 After the 2005 protest, the Contact Group (France, 
Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) created “Guiding 
Principles” to find a resolution to the issue of Kosovo’s sovereign status, detailed below: 
1. The settlement of the Kosovo issue should be fully compatible with 
international standards of human rights, democracy and international law and contribute 
to regional security.  
2. The settlement of Kosovo’s Status should conform with democratic values and 
European standards and contribute to realizing the European perspective of Kosovo, in 
particular, Kosovo’s progress in the stabilization and association process, as well as the 
integration of the entire region in Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
3. The settlement should ensure multiethnicity that is sustainable in Kosovo. It 
should provide effective constitutional guarantees and appropriate mechanisms to ensure 
the implementation of human rights for all citizens in Kosovo and of the rights of 
members of all Kosovo communities, including the right of refugees and displaced 
persons to return to their homes in safety.  
4. The settlement should provide mechanisms to ensure the participation of all 
Kosovo communities in government, both on the central and on the local level. Effective 
structures of local self-government established through the decentralization process 
should facilitate the coexistence of different communities and ensure equitable and 
improved access to public services.  
5. The settlement of Kosovo’s status should include specific safeguards for the 
protection of the cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. This should include 
provisions specifying the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s institutions and sites 
and other patrimony in Kosovo.  
6. The settlement of Kosovo’s status should strengthen regional security and 
stability. Thus, it will ensure that Kosovo does not return to the pre-March 1999 situation. 
Any solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be unacceptable. 
There will be no changes in the current territory of Kosovo, i.e. no partition of Kosovo 
and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country. The territorial integrity 
and internal stability of regional neighbours will be fully respected.  
7. The Status settlement will ensure Kosovo’s security. It will also ensure that 
Kosovo does not pose a military or security threat to its neighbours. Specific provisions 
on security arrangements will be included.  
8. The settlement of Kosovo’s status should promote effective mechanisms to 
strengthen Kosovo’s ability to enforce the rule of law, to fight organized crime and 




9. The settlement should ensure that Kosovo can develop in a sustainable way 
both economically and politically and that it can cooperate effectively with international 
organizations and international financial institutions.  
10. For some time Kosovo will continue to need an international civilian and 
military presence to exercise appropriate supervision of compliance of the provisions of 
the Status settlement, to ensure security and, in particular, protection for minorities as 
well as to monitor and support the authorities in the continued implementation of 
standards.115  
 
The Contact Group made special notice in their statement of the people of Kosovo’s role in 
deciding the future of Kosovo. However, the principles centered on the European perspective 
and the maintenance of the European accession process, effectively deciding the larger 
orientation for the future of Kosovo before any vote could occur. The Contact Group’s statement 
exemplified the realization in the international community of the importance of a final decision 
on sovereign status after the KAN protests and other outbreaks of violence in Kosovo.116  
The UN envoy to Kosovo, Marti Ahtisaari, began final status talks between Serbia and 
Kosovo in 2006. After 17 rounds of futile talks, Ahtisaari abandoned the diplomatic process.117 
In February 2007, he proposed the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement 
(CSP), known as the Ahtisaari Plan. The plan enforced the formation of the International 
Steering Group (ISG), the International Civilian Representative for Kosovo (ICR) and the EU 
Special Representative (EUSR) who would be appointed by the Council of the EU. The CSP was 
to exist as the superior legal power to the laws and constitution in Kosovo. Though the Ahtisaari 
plan was rejected in the UNSC by Russia due to its recommendation for eventual independence 
for Kosovo, the plan was explicitly mentioned in the February 2008 declaration of independence 
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and effectively incorporated into the Kosovo constitution.118 The “unofficial” CSP was 
terminated in 2012, four years after Kosovo’s official declaration of independence. KAN had 
organized a protest against the Ahtisaari Plan in 2007 which ended with two dead and dozens of 
injured protesters after UNMIK police fired out-of-date bullets at the crowd.119 The leader of 
KAN, Albin Kurti, was arrested by the UNMIK police and spent nearly two years in jail for 
organizing the protest. Regardless of the popular protests, Kosovo’s political elite fully accepted 
the obligations of the CSP. The international missions would continue, though Kosovo would 
have more official autonomy over its own governance. 
The disaster colonial project in Kosovo is inextricably linked to the global system in 
which it took place. Its forceful start represents the international consensus on state-building and 
peacekeeping at the time. “Good governance,” the leading paradigm in international law and 
institutions, was used as the basis for the colonial governance structure in Kosovo.120 The 
disaster colonialism in Kosovo, like old modes of colonialism, relied on the universal ideas of 
progress and development to justify its total power. It requires universal acceptance in order to 
function, and the humanitarian nature of the mission made this sort of acceptance possible. The 
end of the Cold War meant that the paradigm of human rights could serve as the hegemonic 
doctrine of international relations.121 Kosovo allowed this doctrine to prove itself as it had been 
unable to do totally in Bosnia-Herzegovina only a few years prior. The doctrine is characterized 
by its legal, political, economic, and moral aspects; in Kosovo, it was not enough to build 
democratic institutions, but to enforce the adoption of a market economy, European currency, 
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and open capital controls, ensuring that the territory would follow the North Atlantic model of a 
state.122  
It was of little importance to the international organizations operating in Kosovo whether 
the state would actually be recognized as sovereign. The international community, for all the 
powers that it held as administrators of the future of Kosovo, refrained from determining the core 
aspect of Kosovo’s future: its sovereignty as a state. Though the international community entered 
Kosovo in 1999 in order to regulate state actions as they relate to individuals, the popular 
expression of the individuals themselves were not part of the mission for democratic governance. 
The enforcement of the Euro-Atlantic model was part of the humanitarian project. Kosovo’s 
“disaster” provided the rationale for the state-building project, justifying its continued existence, 
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The EU and “Postcolonialism” in Kosovo 
 
The phasing out of UNMIK began in 2008 after the Assembly of Kosovo adopted the 
declaration of independence from Serbia. The unilateral declaration came after years of high-
level diplomatic negotiations between the major international powers, Kosovo, and Serbia. After 
a deadlock over the issue of independence in 2007, Kosovo’s prime minister put pressure on the 
international community by proposing November 28, an Albanian national holiday, as the date 
for the declaration.123 Ultimately, Kosovo declared independence in the assembly on February 
17th, 2008. In April, the assembly adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo which was 
based on Ahtisaari’s CSP and provided a direct role for the EU in Kosovo.124 The declaration of 
independence came with a pledge to the international community to submit again to international 
supervision and adherence to the Ahtisaari plan. In August of the same year, the UNSG moved to 
reduce the size of UNMIK. 70% of UNMIK staff were removed from their posts in Kosovo, and 
much of the power previously held by the mission was transferred to the EU. The SRSG role was 
transferred to the EU Special Representative (EUSR), giving the EUSR ultimate supervisory 
authority over Kosovo. Consequently, the EU deployed the European Rule of Law Mission 
(EULEX) in 2008 with the aim of strengthening the rule of law while complying with UNMIK’s 
fourth pillar goal of “economic reconstruction” ––companies and investment firms would need a 
competent and reliable justice system in order to ensure the legal protection of property and 
assets in Kosovo. 
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Between 1999-2008, NATO and the UN created a new government and societal 
trajectory for Kosovo. The declaration of independence in 2008 did not lead to the end of the 
presences of international organizations in Kosovo, only their weakening. In the wake of 
UNMIK, the EU’s role in Kosovo became clear: it would “Europeanize” Kosovo, but without the 
direct control that UNMIK exercised. The EU did not need to enforce its policies or aims with 
executive action; instead, it could use financial influence to create domestic support for European 
policies from the “bottom-up.” The UNMIK phase of colonial control created many of the 
structures that the EU would utilize during its phase of indirect control.  
EULEX was and continues to be the largest civilian EU foreign policy mission. The EU’s 
interest in creating a common foreign policy has its roots in the formation of the European 
Political Co-operation (EPC) in 1970 which aimed to create a foreign policy and security 
consensus among the European Community (EC), the predecessor to the EU. The end of the 
Cold War created new possibilities for the EC to expand into countries formerly under the 
control of the USSR. However, the wars resulting from the breakup of Yugoslavia highlighted 
the weaknesses of the EPC which could not sufficiently quell violence, war and conflict in the 
European geographic sphere. This created the impetus for the more formal establishment of a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993 as one of the Maastricht Treaty’s three 
“pillars”: European Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Police and Judicial 
Cooperation. The CFSP’s objectives were listed as follows: 
— to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of 
the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;  
— to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;  
— to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final 
Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;  
— to promote international cooperation;  
 58 
— to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.125  
The domination of UN and EU values is reflected in the document, which combines the 
protection of these values with the need for strong international security. The threat of the Balkan 
conflicts to the EU is made clear by the CFSP’s concern over security, both regional and 
international, tying the interests of Europe to the interests of the international world system. 
Today, over 130 European External Action Service (EEAS) Delegations are deployed around the 
world with the express objectives to implement EU policies.126 These delegations, in 
combination with the enlargement strategy of the EU, prove the EU’s commitment to increased 
power in foreign affairs. This commitment translated to EULEX’s initial mandate, established by 
the Council of the EU on February 4th, 2008, which gives the mission the following tasks: 
(a) monitor, mentor and advise the competent Kosovo institutions on all areas related to 
the wider rule of law (including a customs service), whilst retaining certain executive 
responsibilities;  
(b) ensure the maintenance and promotion of the rule of law, public order and security 
including, as necessary, in consultation with the relevant international civilian authorities 
in Kosovo, through reversing or annulling operational decisions taken by the competent 
Kosovo authorities;  
(c) help to ensure that all Kosovo rule of law services, including a customs service, are 
free from political interference;  
(d) ensure that cases of war crimes, terrorism, organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic 
crimes, financial/economic crimes and other serious crimes are properly investigated, 
prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced, according to the applicable law, including, where 
appropriate, by international investigators, prosecutors and judges jointly with Kosovo 
investigators, prosecutors and judges or independently, and by measures including, as 
appropriate, the creation of cooperation and coordination structures between police and 
prosecution authorities;  
(e) contribute to strengthening cooperation and coordination throughout the whole 
judicial process, particularly in the area of organised crime;  
(f) contribute to the fight against corruption, fraud and financial crime;  
(g) contribute to the implementation of the Kosovo Anti- Corruption Strategy and Anti-
Corruption Action Plan;  
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(h) assume other responsibilities, independently or in support of the competent Kosovo 
authorities, to ensure the maintenance and promotion of the rule of law, public order and 
security, in consultation with the relevant Council agencies; and  
(i) ensure that all its activities respect international standards concerning human rights 
and gender mainstreaming.127  
EULEX’s mandate ensured continued authorities for the international community and the 
prevention of certain authorities, such as the keeping of a national, independent police and army 
for Kosovo. The mandate has been renewed every two years since 2008, though the mission 
relinquished much of its executive authority in Kosovo’s judicial system in 2018.128 Generally, 
EULEX held authority over the police, customs, and the judiciary in Kosovo following the 
declaration of independence. Its more popular function, however, was to bring the biggest war 
crimes offenders in Kosovo to justice. In this regard, the mission was lacking. 
EULEX took over 1,200 cases from UNMIK’s authority, most relating to war crimes. It 
initially dropped 500 due to a lack of evidence.129 On August 25th, 2009, the activist group and 
budding political party Vetëvendosja staged violent protests against the EULEX mission in 
which 28 EU vehicles were damaged, three Kosovo police officers were injured, and 21 arrests 
were made by the Kosovo police.130 Some international actors also criticized the mission. In 
2012, the European Court of Auditors deemed EULEX to be “ineffective due to lack of 
experience and political interference” among a variety of other negative assessments regarding 
the mission, suggesting major reforms.131 German diplomat and former Head of Mission Bernd 
Borchardt addressed growing discontent with the mission in 2013: 
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The majority of war crimes suspects for crimes committed against Kosovar Albanians 
during the war are Kosovo Serb, or Serbian nationals. But they are no longer in Kosovo. 
The judiciary of Kosovo (including EULEX) can conduct investigations against alleged 
perpetrators, but has only jurisdiction in Kosovo. We all follow Kosovo Law, and 
Kosovo Law says that nobody can be tried in absentia. If alleged perpetrators are outside 
the country, there is little we can do other than share what information we have with 
prosecution services in other jurisdictions. And we do it.132 
Though Borchardt attempted to quell criticism of the mission, the reality became clear that the 
promises of justice for victims of war crimes were too great to meet. By this point, Vetëvendosja 
had gained power in the Parliament of Kosovo and became a fully established political party. 
They proposed a resolution in 2015 to initiate investigations into the workings of EULEX after 
allegations of corruption and inefficiency.133 This was the first local government rebuke of 
EULEX which faced allegations of cooperation with the PDK members that it was supposed to 
investigate for war crimes. Ultimately, only 15 cases of war crimes were adjudicated by 
EULEX.134 
The rule of law mission served as only one facet of the European control over Kosovo 
following 2008. The broader goal of the EU, in line with its 4th pillar designation during UNMIK 
rule, was to prepare Kosovo’s economy for integration into the world economy using European 
best practices. Kosovo was the smallest and poorest country to emerge from the former 
Yugoslavia where it was run under the federal socialist self-management economic system. Once 
UNMIK arrived, the mission moved to place Kosovo on a fast-track towards the implementation 
of an open market society in keeping with the dominant Western models of economic growth. 
After years of UNMIK rule and international aid flows, the country was reliant on financial 
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inflows from outside of the region to the point of dependency. This was also what allowed for a 
coercive relationship between the EU and Kosovo. The level of aid was substantial:  
In per capita terms, after the 1999 conflict Kosovo received from the international 
community 50 times more peacekeeping troops and 25 times more funds than 
Afghanistan did after the 2001 war. And in 2011 Kosovo was still receiving between four 
and ten times more aid per capita than any of its neighbours–– Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Serbia–– that had witnessed wars or revolutions between 1991 and 2001, 
and 19 times more than the average developing country.135  
 
The EU was one of the largest funders and creditors to Kosovo, providing monetary assistance 
for government functions. As with many creditors, however, this money came with stipulations. 
Kosovo was to use EU money for specific purposes, which enabled the EU to indirectly shape 
and produce new forces in Kosovo’s society. The EU has continuously made clear that Kosovo 
must implement the changes that it requests in order to obtain its financial assistance––over 3.3 
billion euros since 1999, making it the largest per capita yearly contribution ever provided to a 
developing country136–– and for ultimate EU accession. 
In order to monitor the usage of money provided and generally surveil the 
implementation of the European perspective, the EU relied on the European Office in Kosovo. 
The EU Office in Kosovo is the primary EU organ responsible for monitoring and executing aid, 
loans, and implementation of EU directives to Kosovo. The EU Office, in its own words, “assists 
Kosovo in realising its European agenda.” There is no question of an alternative for Kosovo 
outside of the European agenda. Further, the European agenda is one that is inherently present 
within Kosovo, but which needs assistance to be fully implemented. Here one can observe the 
echo of the colonial “civilizing mission” which at its core universalizes the methods, rules, and 
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laws of the colonial power onto the colony, which needs the colonial presence in order to apply 
these “best practices.”  
The colonial techniques that the EU employed were supplemented by the EU’s refusal to 
recognize Kosovo as an independent state autonomous from Serbia. Though the EU was to be 
responsible for the court system and the implementation of many governance strategies in 
Kosovo, it could not support the Kosovo state as such. Thus, any EU action in Kosovo first made 
clear its neutral position on the matter of territory and sovereignty before going on to influence 
and make decisions for the people of Kosovo. The disclaimer of neutrality was important to the 
EU countries of Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain whose separatist (and mostly 
geographically united) national minorities would be encouraged to secede if their governments 
gave the same recognition to Kosovo. These governments criticized Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence as a breach of the international norms surrounding sovereignty.137  
Notwithstanding the inability of the body to address the issue of territorial sovereignty, 
the EU continued to exercise its authority in Kosovo. As Kosovo emerged from UNMIK rule, 
the consequences of inaction on the question of territory were revealed. Using the terms of the 
EU and the international community at large, the “democratization” of Kosovo and the 
“normalization” of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia were fruitless in their aims to address 
the territorial dispute. The international community was successful in providing local governing 
bodies in parallel structures to UNMIK. These were found in the PISG structure dominated by 
the two major Kosovar political parties, the Partia Demokratike e Kosovës (PDK) and the Lidhja 
Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK). The PDK utilized UNMIK’s need for success in its state-
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building project to push forward its former KLA leaders as UNMIK-sponsored politicians. Many 
of the leaders of the PDK were later charged with human rights crimes for actions committed 
during the war as part of their work for the KLA. The PDK, however, was able to strengthen 
patrimonial networks across Kosovo during the period of UNMIK rule, setting itself up for 
power after independence. This was a goal of the local political elite from the start of the 
international intervention in Kosovo––as long as the narrative of democratization existed, the 
political elite could claim to work to meet the goals of UNMIK and later the EU while narrowing 
the possibilities for democratic competition.138  
The political elite in Kosovo, primarily led by the PDK and LDK parties, pushed Kosovo 
towards compliance with the EU and “Euro-Atlantic integration,” giving them the legitimacy 
they need by invoking wealthy external states as models for Kosovo. This was used as a way to 
stay in power; there was little indication that the PDK or LDK held strong beliefs in the EU 
model.139 During the UNMIK period, the population of Kosovo was constrained from the realm 
of politics. The distribution of power between UNMIK and the PISG was unclear, particularly to 
the public, and there was little room for local governance initiatives. After UNMIK, the 
international community did not need to “hide” behind the rhetoric of local ownership; it could 
show that the territory governed itself directly. The extent to which “ownership” was 
independent from external forces, however, was less certain.  
 The economic influence of the EU over Kosovo translated to political and governing 
influence. The conditionality of the aid used by the EU in Kosovo was not the only means by 
which the international inflows of money affected the society of the country. As one of the only 
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ways that many post-war economies can obtain national income, international aid is essential to 
the survival of these countries’ economies, particularly if they are subject to global trade and 
financial flows–– a condition which UNMIK ensured for Kosovo from the start of its mission. 
This creates a situation of dependence for the post-war country, one that is found to increase 
incentives for illegal sources of money such as smuggling, drug trafficking, and organized 
crime.140 These illegal activities were part of the business model of the KLA, which used illegal 
methods such as drug trafficking to finance its guerilla war in the 1990s.141 As the KLA 
transferred its power into local government and business, a process sponsored by UNMIK, 
Kosovo was entrenched in two economic dependencies: the illegal income flows from the 
corrupt political elite, and international aid.142 
By touting the narrative of Europeanization and integration as the future for Kosovo, the 
elites avoided a reckoning over the corruption in the Kosovar government as well as the lack of 
accountability and transparency.143 The distrust of government and lack of social mobility in 
Kosovo served as domestic factors of discontent and furthered the dependence on international 
organizations. Compounded with these factors was the effect of international organizations on 
the domestic job market: 
Job opportunities at international field missions on the artificially inflated NGO market 
(through participation in international reconstruction, institution- or capacity-building 
programs) are often among the few opportunities for the local population to earn legal 
money, with salaries much higher than the local average. With their usual recruitment 
approaches, international missions tend to select young, well-educated, English-speaking 
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local staff…international missions initiate a kind of ‘brain drain’ on the spot, which 
further aggravates the overall local dependency on external assistance.144 
 
The effect of the “civilizing mission” should be thus be understood both in its capacity to 
productively form Kosovar society and in its domination over the society’s population. The 
Europeanization of Kosovo and ultimate EU accession will have an even greater effect on the 
issue of “brain drain.” Kosovo is the only potential candidate for EU accession in the Balkans 
that does not have visa free access to the Schengen Area of the EU. In 2010, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was given visa liberalization to the Schengen zone.145 By 2017, the percent of those who 
originated from the country living abroad increased over 140%.146 Once Kosovar citizens are 
given greater visa access as a result of the progression of the accession process, the migration 
trend will likely continue in Kosovo.147 
Ultimately, the efforts of the international community were ineffective in resolving the 
conflict in Kosovo so long as they focused on state-building and “good governance” 
implementation––methods which were exported from Europe and the U.S. as part of a shared 
belief in the benefits of expertise as a mode of governance. The EU’s accession process proved 
to be the only method by which to end the land dispute at the core of the conflict in Kosovo by 
stipulating concessions from the Kosovo and Serb governments in exchange for further benefits 
from the EU. Once Serbia relinquished the fight for sovereignty over the territory of Kosovo, it 
could begin the EU accession process which has been shown to lead to foreign investment and 
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inflows of money into a country.148 Serbia and Kosovo agreed to normalize relations in 2013, 
and in 2014 Serbia was invited to begin accession talks. The EU claimed the historical victory as 
“proof of the power of the EU perspective and its role in healing history’s deep scars.”149  
In this way, the “postcolonial” situation in Kosovo was one that established a much more 
effective form of control over the region. The EU accession process was one which aligned with 
the initial goal of Kosovo: to become a sovereign state independent of Serbia. To aim for EU 
accession, therefore, was to gain sovereignty and recognition from a major world power. As 
Vetëvendosja and its platform of self-determination gained power, the role of the EU in 
Kosovo’s future became clear. No longer was it the authoritarian body which imposed systems 
and laws directly onto the people of Kosovo; in the era of independence, the people’s 
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Conclusion 
 In October 2019, the nationalist, anti-establishment, self-determination party 
Vetëvendosja won a surprising victory in Kosovo’s parliamentary election. The win was seen as 
representative of the overall dissatisfaction of the population of Kosovo with the political status 
quo. The party, led by former activist Albin Kurti, ran on a campaign of anti-corruption, a 
contrast to the PDK and LDK which were believed to hold various corrupt ties. Vetëvendosja 
gained even more ground in the February 2021 parliamentary election, winning 48% of the vote 
while the PDK and LDK won 18% and 14%, respectively. Kurti made clear after the election 
that Vetëvendosja would operate according to the will of the people, rejecting the Western 
importance placed on relations with Serbia:  
It will not be a priority for us to form a team for the dialogue with Serbia. You know that 
in all public surveys, the dialogue with Serbia is the sixth or seventh issue. We have been 
voted by those citizens, and we respond to them. The main priority is justice and creating 
jobs.150 
 
The importance of justice to the political sphere was important, particularly as prominent leaders 
of the PDK and LDK parties faced indictments from war crimes tribunals, including the UN 
International Court of Justice in The Hague.151 Vetëvendosja advocated for the right of the 
people in Kosovo to make political decisions. In their manifesto, they call for the presence of 
international organizations to be decreased to only the necessary mechanisms for monitoring 
minority rights. Further, they note that the document which gave the UN its power in Kosovo, 
Resolution 1244, treats the individuals in Kosovo as residents of the territory, a status which 
 
150 VOA News, “Vetevendosje Marks Landslide Victory in Kosovo’s General Election,” Voice of America News, 
February 15, 2021. 
151 “Kosovo PM Haradinaj Resigns Over War Crimes Summons,” BBC, July 19, 2019. Zenel Zhinipotoku and 
Llazar Semini, “Kosovo’s President Resigns to Face War Crimes Charges,” Associated Press, November 5, 2020. 
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denies political power and reduces the individual to the status of a refugee.152 The power of self-
determination, individual freedom, and justice for the people of Kosovo is, according to 
Vetëvendosja’s manifesto, in line with the interests of the EU. What remains to be seen, then, is 
whether Vetëvendosja’s focus on independence and sovereignty will curtail the trajectory that 
disaster colonialism has set for Kosovo’s future, or whether it will conform to the predetermined 
path laid by NATO, the UN, and the EU. 
… 
 The case of disaster colonialism in Kosovo bears important questions for the current state 
of affairs in the international system. As I have stated, disaster colonialism in Kosovo was part of 
a historical situation following the Cold War in which certain ideas about liberal-democracy, 
human rights, and good governance were fighting for hegemony. My emphasis on the end of the 
Cold War entails a pre-history, after which the events which I have described unfold. The issues 
of minorities, sovereign rights, and international order which are characteristic of the global 
system of nation-states did not begin, however, with the Cold War. Writing at the end of the 
second World War, Hannah Arendt identified the origins of the totalitarian politics of the first 
half of the twentieth century with the problem of minorities and the stateless in the European 
nation-state system.153 For Arendt, the two World Wars revealed the implicit condition of the 
universality of international human rights whose paradigm was initiated by the French 
Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789.154 The only guarantee for the protection 
of human rights, according to Arendt, was the nation-state. Thus, the nation-state was the 
 
152 “Manifesto of VETËVENDOSJE!,” January 2019, https://www.vetevendosje.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/Manifesti-11494292623.pdf. 
153 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism: Imperialism (Cleveland, OH: The World Publishing Company, 
1958). 
154 Ibid., 290-291.  
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effective limit of the universalism of human rights, resulting in a situation in which those falling 
outside of the authority of the state were not only deprived of the rights of citizens but also their 
“inalienable” human rights.  
 During the first half of the twentieth century, there was no effective institution outside of 
the nation-state which could enforce the protection of human rights. Kosovo represents a shift 
which occurred during the second half of the twentieth century in which the nation-state’s 
hegemony as the guarantor of individuals’ rights was questioned and ultimately overridden by 
international organizations. International organizations like the UN and NATO would, on one 
hand, seem to solve the problem of human rights enforcement with which Arendt is concerned. 
What I have aimed to show, however, is that the paradigm of humanitarian intervention, at least 
when executed on behalf of international organizations, carries a set of assumptions which are 
colonial at their core. The declaration of the exceptional state of “disaster” is the first stage in 
this process of colonialism in which the people are subjugated to the status of nonpolitical beings 
and to the rule of international governing elites. For Arendt, the exceptions of the stateless and 
minorities defined the problems of the nation-state system; today, the enforcement of human 
rights in order to eliminate exceptions to the liberal-democratic order creates a situation in which 
the people have no right over their own futures. The individuals whose rights are protected 
thereby lose the right to political autonomy. This paradox operates at the heart of disaster 
colonialism as I have attempted to define it in this paper: the international community, acting on 
behalf of the protection of human rights, seizes states of exception to the humanitarian order and 
implements nondemocratic governance and reforms. Although I have focused exclusively on the 
case of Kosovo, I believe that the concept of disaster colonialism can be applied more broadly to 
other international interventions and speaks to contemporary concerns in international relations.  
 70 
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